Who rules Mali — and who doesn't
Mali, a country nearly twice the size of France with approximately 25 million inhabitants, formally has no civilian government. Since August 2020, the country has been ruled by a military junta led by General Assimi Goïta, who at that time overthrew elected president Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta. In May 2021, Goïta consolidated power with a second coup and declared himself "transitional president," promising a return to elections within two years. The elections never took place. Al Jazeera, November 2025 ↗In April 2024, the junta suspended the political activities of all parties. In July 2025, the transitional parliament approved a five-year presidential mandate for Goïta, renewable without elections — a move that opened the way for him to rule until at least 2030. Civilian prime minister Choguel Maïga, who dared to openly criticize the postponement of elections, was already dismissed in November 2024. The junta has thus effectively excluded the opposition from public life and concentrated power in the hands of Goïta's presidential office and the defense ministry. Al Jazeera ↗
The junta's control outside Bamako and the major garrisons is uneven. The army holds several regional centers, including Kidal, which it reoccupied in November 2023, but vast rural areas in the north and center of the country are under the influence of Tuareg rebels, JNIM, or other armed actors. In central Mali, particularly the Mopti and Ségou regions, JNIM holds strong influence and regularly attacks the army, convoys, and local communities. Mali's state army (FAMa), according to older security estimates, has about 18,000 personnel, but a large portion is tied down defending Bamako and the northern garrisons. To fill the missing capacity, the junta has since 2021 been importing Russian mercenaries — first the Wagner Group, and since mid-2024 its successor, Africa Corps, which is directly run by the Russian defense ministry. Al Jazeera ↗
Six towns at once, junta headquarters under fire
The Malian army confirmed on Saturday morning that the fight against "terrorist groups" continues. The statement came shortly after 06:00 GMT, following two loud explosions and concentrated gunfire near the Kati base, which lies on the outskirts of Bamako and also serves as General Goïta's residence. Soldiers, according to witnesses cited by Reuters, blocked the surrounding roads. Al Jazeera ↗At the same time, gunfire also erupted near a military camp close to Bamako-Senou international airport, home to Russian mercenaries of the Africa Corps unit. Further attacks were reported in Sevare and Mopti in central Mali, and Gao and Kidal in the north — six locations in total. Flights to Bamako airport were cancelled in the morning. Reuters via Honolulu Star-Advertiser ↗
FLA spokesman Mohamed Elmaouloud Ramadane stated on social media that Tuareg forces control "multiple positions in Kidal and Gao." Reuters could not independently verify the claim. According to Reuters, JNIM has not yet claimed responsibility for the attacks; nor has the Sahel branch of the Islamic State. Given the scale of the coordinated action, this is notable so far, but without further evidence it cannot be taken as a sign of a change in strategy. Reuters wire ↗
Africa Corps under fire
The camp near the airport, which hosts Africa Corps, became one of the targets of the offensive. According to Soufan Center estimates, the unit has about a thousand soldiers in Mali and operates under the direct control of the Russian defense ministry. France ended its military presence in Mali in 2022 after a rift with the junta; the UN mission MINUSMA was later pushed out by Malian authorities, following a June 2023 UN Security Council decision, ending on December 31, 2023. This closed the era of Western military presence in the country. Al Jazeera ↗The record of Russian mercenaries in Mali is contentious. At Tinzaouaten in July 2024, Wagner and the Malian army suffered their heaviest known defeat in Africa — the rebels claimed to have killed 84 Russians and dozens of Malian soldiers, though the exact toll has not been independently confirmed. In 2022, Russian mercenaries were identified by UN investigators as participants in a massacre of civilians in the town of Moura, where, according to the UN, more than 500 people died. Soufan Center ↗
Why now: fuel blockade since autumn
The attack comes at a moment when Mali is economically exhausted by JNIM's fuel blockade. Since September 2025, the group has been attacking tankers heading from Senegal and Ivory Coast — countries from which Mali, before the blockade, obtained approximately 95% of its fuel. According to Al Jazeera, gasoline prices in Bamako have in places jumped from 25 to 130 dollars per liter, more than quadrupling; schools are closed and power outages are intensifying. The Soufan Center already wrote in early November 2025 that the country "stands on the brink of collapse." Al Jazeera + Soufan Center ↗JNIM, formed in March 2017 through the merger of four jihadist groups under the leadership of Tuareg commander Iyad Ag Ghaly, has an estimated 5,000 to 6,000 fighters spread across Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and in recent months also Ivory Coast, Togo, Benin, and Nigeria. Mali, together with Burkina Faso and Niger, announced its withdrawal from the regional bloc ECOWAS in January 2024; after a one-year notice period, the withdrawal took effect on January 29, 2025. The trio also founded its own Alliance of Sahel States (AES) — a defense partnership since September 2023, a confederation since July 2024, intended to serve as a counterweight to West African democracies. This move also stripped the junta of its last regional international support. DW ↗
Three scenarios
The junta repels the attack. Analysts note that neither JNIM nor the FLA currently have the capacity to permanently hold major towns. The attack could be a show of force — demonstrating that the rebels can strike even the country's most fortified sites, including Goïta's residence. In this scenario, the junta survives, but its legitimacy continues to erode. Soufan Center ↗The start of a longer siege phase. The fuel blockade, economic breakdown, and now also symbolic attacks on government targets represent an exhaustion strategy that JNIM has been applying since autumn 2025. Saturday's offensive may signal that the group has moved from economic pressure to military penetration of urban centers. Al Jazeera ↗
Erosion of the junta. If the collapse of defenses in Kidal and Gao is confirmed, and Africa Corps fails to protect access to Bamako, this could mark the beginning of the fall of Goïta's regime. The domino effect would primarily affect neighboring Burkina Faso and Niger — partners in the Alliance of Sahel States, where similar Russian-backed juntas rule. For Europe, a collapse could mean renewed migration and terrorism pressure from the Sahel, a region where Brussels and Paris have lost most of their military and political leverage since 2022. Soufan Center ↗
What HotInfo is watching
- A JNIM massacre of civilian populations linked to self-defence militias→ Mali po dvanástich dňoch ofenzívy: vyše 30 mŕtvych v Korikori a Gomossogou. JNI…Korikori a Gomossogou (Mopti) 6.5.2026 večer — 30+ až 50+ obetí vrátane detí. JNIM hlási odvetu proti Dan Nan Ambassagou. V ten istý deň aj útok na väznicu Kenieroba (2 500 väzňov, 72 high-value).
- Bamako — whether the fighting moves to the capital→ Mali, piaty deň ofenzívy: JNIM blokuje cesty do Bamaka a vyzýva na pád junty. G…JNIM uvalil čiastočnú cestnú blokádu Bamaka (28.4.-1.5.). Hraničné uzly s Pobrežím Slonoviny, Senegalom a Guineou.
- Goïta's junta — statements, mobilisation, a request for help (Wagner/Africa Corps?)→ Mali, piaty deň ofenzívy: JNIM blokuje cesty do Bamaka a vyzýva na pád junty. G…Goïta TV adresa 28.4. večer: "Operácie budú pokračovať, kým nebudú ozbrojené skupiny úplne neutralizované." Stretnutie s ruským veľvyslancom Gromykom v ten istý deň.
- Kidal and Gao — control by the FLA vs. the army after further days→ Mali, tretí deň ofenzívy: Kidal padol, Africa Corps ustúpila, Goïta nevidieťKidal padol pod kontrolu FLA, Africa Corps oficiálne potvrdila stiahnutie 27.4.
- The JNIM–FLA link — tactical coordination or a strategic alliance (an official statement?)→ Mali, piaty deň ofenzívy: JNIM blokuje cesty do Bamaka a vyzýva na pád junty. G…JNIM 30.4. vyzval na "spoločný front" (front commun) proti junte. France24 to rámcuje ako "alliance de circonstance". Hovorca FLA Mohamed Elmaouloud Ramadane v Paríži ohlásil ďalšie ciele: Gao, Timbuktu, Ménaka.
- Niger and Burkina Faso — whether the offensive spreads to neighbouring AES countriesJNIM už expanduje za hranice Mali (pred ofenzívou 25.4.). Kontrola: veľké časti juhovýchodného Burkina, juhozápadného Niger. Spreading na juh: Togo, Benin, severná Ghana, severozápadná Nigéria — fears of jihadist corridor to Gulf of Guinea. AES (Alliance of Sahel States) koordinuje letecké útoky 1.5. (Africanews). Tri-border region (Mali/Niger/Burkina) najhoršie zóny. (ICG, CFR, ADF Magazine 03.2…
- A public appearance by Goïta, or Malick Diaw on state television→ Mali, piaty deň ofenzívy: JNIM blokuje cesty do Bamaka a vyzýva na pád junty. G…Goïta vystúpil 28.4. večer v televízii s prvým živým prejavom od ofenzívy. AP zverejnila aj fotografie zo stretnutia s ruským veľvyslancom Gromykom v prezidentskom paláci.
- Africa Corps transit through Libya — confirmation or denialNepotvrdené ani vyvrátené. Žiadne nezávislé OSINT/satelitné snímky tranzitu cez Líbyu sa neobjavili v Soufan/Critical Threats/Foreign Policy analyses za 3 týždne. Téma vychladla bez dôkazu — pravdepodobne Africa Corps ostáva na juhu (Bamako oblasť), severné posádky stiahnuté lokálne, nie cez Líbyu.
- Verification of the helicopter shot down near Gao (independent imagery)Nezávislá verifikácia zostreleného vrtuľníka pri Gao sa NEDOSTAVILA. JNIM tvrdenia neboli potvrdené OSINT analytikmi (Critical Threats, Soufan, BISI). Po 3 týždňoch už pravdepodobne nepríde — buď nedošlo k zostreleniu, alebo dôkazy zostali utajené.
- Africa Corps out of Bamako and Gao — whether the Kidal withdrawal is not an isolated caseÚstup z Kidalu NIE JE izolovaný — broader trend straty Russia's grip on Africa. Foreign Policy 13.5.: „Mali Attacks Reveal Flaws in Russian Security Partnership". Soufan Center 12.5.: „Limits of Russia's Africa Corps". Spectator: „Russia is losing its grip on Africa". Júnta Goïta však pokračuje partnerstvo s Ruskom — Africa Corps zostáva v Bamaku/Gao, ale s obmedzenými kapacitami. JNIM uzavrel ce…







