Hungarian Parliament Closes the Door on Orbán's Return. It Approved an 8-Year Limit and Returns University Foundations to the State

On Monday, the Hungarian Parliament approved the sixteenth amendment to the Fundamental Law — a constitutional change intended to retroactively impose an eight-year cap on the office of prime minister and close off Viktor Orbán's return to power. With the same package, Péter Magyar's government wants to return to state control the asset foundations into which Orbán's cabinet had for years transferred universities and public property, and to abolish the controversial Sovereignty Protection Office. The catch lies in the final step: the amendment must be signed by President Tamás Sulyok — the very man Magyar is simultaneously trying to remove from office. 444 ↗

The door closes on Orbán

At the core of the amendment is a cap that no one may exceed: a maximum of eight years in the office of prime minister in total, counted retroactively from May 2, 1990, and including both continuous and interrupted terms. Orbán, who governed Hungary in two periods — briefly from 1998 to 2002 and then continuously from 2010 until this year's defeat — has thus long since exhausted the limit and can no longer return to office. A constitutional amendment requires 133 votes; Tisza alone holds 141 of 199 seats, so its majority was comfortably sufficient for approval. EUobserver ↗

During the debate, Magyar could not resist a jab at the Fidesz benches: he thanked them for allegedly helping Tisza secure a two-thirds majority through their own style of governing. Budapest Business Journal ↗

The state reclaims universities and billions

The second, economically most significant part of the amendment targets the so-called KEKVA — public-benefit foundations that manage assets. Over previous years, Orbán's government transferred dozens of universities and extensive public property into these foundations, while also shifting founder's rights to boards of trustees staffed with allies. Critics saw this as a way to permanently remove public money from state control — a future government would never get it back. Daily News Hungary ↗

The amendment now enshrines in the constitution that the assets of these foundations are national property, that founder's rights pass to the government, and that the government may also dissolve the foundations; upon dissolution, the assets revert to the state. University foundations have a one-year transitional period to transform. Tisza's sponsor of the bill, Márton Melléthei-Barna, described it as a step against "arrogance and arbitrariness," arguing that institutions with no legitimate public function have no place in a constitutional democracy. 444 ↗

The end of the Sovereignty Protection Office

The third strike is the abolition of the Sovereignty Protection Office, which Orbán's government established at the end of 2023. It was meant to examine "foreign influences" on public life, but critics at home and in Brussels viewed it as a tool for intimidating independent media and NGOs; the European Commission launched proceedings against Hungary over its powers. The amendment abolishes it by simply striking the sentence that anchored its existence in the constitution. EUobserver ↗

Tisza originally also planned to strike the clause protecting "constitutional identity and Christian culture," but backed away from this step after sharp criticism from Fidesz — the passage remains in the constitution, and Fidesz claimed this as a victory. Daily News Hungary ↗

Fidesz calls it "Lex Orbán"

The opposition voted against the entire package. Fidesz describes the prime ministerial cap as an opportunistic norm tailored to a single person — "Lex Orbán" — and objects in particular to its retroactive effect: changing the constitution to retroactively exclude a specific politician is, in its view, contrary to the principles of the rule of law. According to Fidesz, the norm doesn't just harm Orbán but also voters, taking away their ability to choose him in future elections. Some conservative commentators note that both sides accuse each other of hypocrisy in this dispute: Orbán's majority amended the Fundamental Law fifteen times and itself pushed through tailor-made laws, and today Tisza is using the same tool against Fidesz. Hungarian Conservative (conservative commentary) ↗

A catch named Sulyok

For the amendment to take effect, it must be signed by the president. And this is where the story gets complicated: the head of state is Tamás Sulyok, a former chairman of the Constitutional Court who was elevated to office by Orbán's majority and whom Magyar has repeatedly called "Orbán's puppet." The prime minister gave him an ultimatum to resign by the end of May; Sulyok refused, and Magyar ordered the launch of a procedure to remove him, expected to take about a month. The president is legally contesting his removal. The Washington Times (AP) ↗

Sulyok cannot substantively stop the amendment — at most, in the case of a constitutional change, he can ask the Constitutional Court to review whether parliament adopted it through the prescribed procedure, which would delay its entry into force. The dismantling of the system Orbán built over sixteen years could thus get stuck on the signature of the very man who is himself its last remaining personnel trace. For Slovak and Czech readers, this offers a vivid illustration of how, right across the border, the unwinding of an "illiberal" state unfolds after a change of power — and how many legal and personnel knots must be untied before the change truly takes effect.

What hotinfo is following

• Whether and when Sulyok will sign the amendment, or ask the Constitutional Court to review the adoption procedure
• The fate of Magyar's procedure to remove the president (announced timeline of around a month)
• How the return of university KEKVA foundations to the state unfolds during the one-year transitional period
• The reaction of the European Commission, which conducted proceedings against Hungary over the Sovereignty Protection Office
• Whether Fidesz will challenge the retroactive effect of the prime ministerial cap before the Constitutional Court